Statistics reveal that the Border Security Force (BSF) has so far, this year, apprehended 8,196 persons who were trying enter India illegally from Bangladesh. The numbers that successfully manage to evade the security forces on the border, is of course, much larger. Apart from the usual suspects, the militants and economic migrants, the recent political turmoil in Bangladesh has also resulted in many Bangladeshi political dissidents and people from the religious minorities attempting to sneak into India to avoid political and religious persecution.
In an interview on 28th November 2006, the Director General of Border Security Force (BSF) described the Indo-Bangladesh border as a "problem area for tomorrow". He revealed that investigations into the recent terrorists bombings in India have indicated that militants are "freely using" the porous border to enter into India to carry out their heinous acts. According to the BSF Director General, the increasing numbers has made it virtually impossible to stop illegal entry despite sincere efforts by the security forces. Therefore, it is necessary that as much attention be given to the Eastern border with Bangladesh, as is currently given to the Western border.
The Indo-Bangladesh border is highly porous making the illegal movement of people and goods a perennial problem. The terrain and the demographic composition of the border area make it conducive for Bangladeshis to sneak into India and also to get easily assimilated into the local populace. Migration from Bangladesh into India, especially in Assam and Tripura has primarily been driven by the quest for better economic opportunities. Many Bangladeshis have also crossed over into India to escape political and religious persecution. Over the years, the magnitude of this illegal migration had reached such an astounding proportion that it had begun to alter the demographic profile and threaten the socio-political fabric of the border states. The porous nature of the border and the constant flow of people have also made it easy for Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) to cross over into Bangladesh, where they have set up safe houses and training camps under the benign eyes of Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence services. The increasing influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh has resulted in the large-scale push into India, of not only economic migrants, but also the foot-soldiers of jihad terrorism and pan-Islamic fundamentalism, all of which have the potential to destabilize the country and threaten national security.
Evidence collected by the police in many recent terrorist incidents including the Mumbai blasts in July, the Varanasi serial blasts in March and attack on the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore in December last year point to an increased use of Bangladeshi territory by ISI backed terrorist groups like the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI). It is suspected that the recent bomb blasts in Jalpaiguri and Guwahati were also carried out by the IIGs on the behest of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) stationed in Bangladesh. The recent weapon hauls in various Northeastern States indicate that Bangladesh has also become a conduit for arms trafficking. Smuggling especially of cattle, human and narcotics trafficking, counterfeit currency, kidnapping and thefts are quite rampant along the border.
The hitherto neglected border along Bangladesh is gradually getting the attention of the Central government, bringing with it much needed money and manpower. Steps like raising additional BSF battalions, construction of more Border Out Posts (BOPs), erection of barb wire fences, building of roads along the border and acquiring new equipment are being undertaken for improving vigilance along the border to check infiltration. The BSF initially had 50 battalions, which was subsequently raised to 66, with more on the way.
Construction of fences has been undertaken in two phases, with Phase I sanctioned in 1987 and Phase II in 2000. Phase I ended with the fencing of only 20 per cent (857 km) of the border, and even this was of limited utility since much of the fencing was subsequently damaged as a result of faulty construction designs and vagaries of weather. Under Phase-II, an additional 2429.5 km of fence was sanctioned and by 31st January 2005, 1275.4 km had been completed. For the first time, a 9.3 km fence has been erected between Mantri char and Kalaibari char. Additional Border Observation Posts (BOPs), along with helipads, have also been constructed on the chars, which could be used for emergency evacuation or deployment. In the current year, the Center has sanctioned Rs. 424 crore for the construction and repair of damaged fences.
Proper roads are essential for effective patrolling along the border. Under Phase-1, 2866.39 km of border roads have been constructed and an additional 797 km has been sanctioned under Phase II. Patrolling on these roads and along the border has further improved with the recent acquisition by the BSF of Global Positioning System (GPS) gadgets, night vision binoculars and hand held thermal image intensifiers. Whilst the night vision gadgets help track infiltrators, the GPS instruments help the BSF personnel to navigate the winding riverine border.
However, erecting fences along the border has not been without its share of problems. The inhospitable terrain, the largely undemarcated border area and consequent border disputes, the non-cooperative attitudes of the various state governments and also that of the Bangla Desh Rifles (BDR) are all hurdles in the way of effectively fencing the border. The state governments have not shown much enthusiasm towards the erection of border fences for a number of reasons. The rehabilitation of displaced people due to fencing is a contentious issue between the central and various state governments. More recently, the government of Tripura has alleged that the BSF is not adhering to guidelines announced by the Ministry of Home Affairs while constructing the fences. India is also facing stiff resistance from Bangladesh at 265 disputed spots as the security forces of both the countries differ on their perception of the location of the boundary. Bangladesh objects on the ground that the construction of any defensive structure within 150 yards of the international boundary is not permitted under guidelines agreed to in 1975. On the other hand, India maintains that it is demolition of defensive structures and not construction of fences that forms part of 1975 guidelines. It must be mentioned that the above mentioned contentious parts constitute only 7 per cent (297 km) of the 4095 km long India-Bangladesh border.
Effective border management and maintenance of peace and tranquility along the border is only possible through mutual cooperation. For this purpose, India and Bangladesh have, down the years, jointly established a number of institutional mechanisms. These include the bi-annual meeting between the BSF and the BDR, the Home Secretary Level talks and the annual meeting of the Joint Boundary Working Group (JBWG). However these institutional mechanisms have failed to deliver any desired results, in the face of Bangladeshi intransigence towards Indian proposals. During successive meetings either at the Home Secretary Levels or at the BSF-BDR levels, Bangladesh has failed to respond to Indian concerns. The Indian side has been constantly raising the issue of the presence of the Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs), especially the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and their camps inside Bangladesh. The BSF had also submitted lists of camps and hideouts of the IIGs in Bangladesh to the BDR and demanded the deportation of the general secretary of ULFA, Anup Chetia and other leaders of militant organizations. But as in the past, Bangladesh has refused to acknowledge the existence of any IIGs or their camps inside Bangladesh. The JBWG has a similar tale of woe. The JBWG was established in June 2001 to implement the Land Boundary Agreement of 1974. In July 2006, the officials of the JBWG met for the third1 time after a gap of four years to deliberate on the longstanding issues of border demarcation and exchange of enclaves and territories presently in the possession of the other side. The two-day meeting ended inconclusively with a decision to meet once a year.
The Indo-Bangladesh border is well on its way to becoming a major headache for India unless the problems afflicting the border are not addressed urgently. The issues of illegal migration, smuggling, spread of Islamic fundamentalism from across the border etc. need to be effectively tackled. Measures like construction of fences and roads have to be undertaken on a war-footing. In addition, it is important to sensitise the border population about the strategic importance of their area and also get them involved in guarding the border. In this regard, the proposal of the Group of Ministers' in their Report on Border Management of 2001 that Village Volunteer Forces (VVF) should be created to assist the security forces in guarding the borders should be considered seriously. Further, proposals like issuance of photo identity cards to the Indian citizens living along the borders and work permits to the Bangladeshi migrants should be considered positively, and work-arounds should be found to take care of objections raised on various grounds. India also needs to constructively engage Bangladesh and develop trade and infrastructure along and across the border so that Bangladesh also has stakes in maintaining a peaceful and tranquil border.
- 1. Earlier it was wrongly written second
The Prime Minister of UK, Tony Blair, visited Pakistan in the third week of November to participate in the third UK-Pakistan bilateral summit. The UK-Pak joint statement of December 6, 2004 institutionalised such bilateral meets at the highest level, to 're-energise' the 'partnership for peace and prosperity in the 21st century'. As these bilateral summits are of a strategic nature and are being pursued without interruption since 2004, it is useful to analyse the scope and extent of such bilateral engagement.
In concrete terms, the latest visit led to an increase in development assistance towards Pakistan for poverty alleviation. The UK decided to double its development assistance to Pakistan from £ 236 million (US$ 456 million) to £480 million (US$ 928 million) in the next three years with an immediate aid assistance of £20 million (US$ 38.7 million). Apart from this, it was also agreed that the UK would deliver two MI 17 helicopters to the Anti Narcotics Force (ANF) of Pakistan in 2007, to add to the Pakistani efforts to patrol the Pak-Afghan border. Both the leaders also discussed the situation in Afghanistan. After the summit meeting, Blair also touched Kabul for the first time and visited the camps of the British troops posted in the southern Afghan city of Helmand.
The joint declaration adopted at the third Pak-British summit highlights the threat of terrorism and extremism. Throughout the document terrorism is projected as the main threat facing both the countries today.
Since the inception of the UK-Pakistan strategic dialogue in 2004, terrorism and extremism have topped the agenda of bilateral talks. In fact, after the July 7 terrorist attacks in London in 2005, it was expected that in the 2005 summit meeting, Pakistan might draw the flak from UK especially in view of the reports that three of the suicide bombers were from the Pakistani diaspora and some of them had even visited Pakistan ahead of the attack. There was also a war of words between the leaderships of the two countries. President Musharraf was particularly aggressive when he asked the British leadership to put its own house in order rather than pointing fingers towards Pakistan.
Against this backdrop there was a strong possibility that the issue of 'Pakistan as the ideological source of extremism in UK' would be highly debated in the summit of 2005. However, the devastating earthquake in the northern area of Pakistan and Kashmir in October 2005 changed the agenda. The London meeting between Tony Blair and the Pakistani Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz in November 2005 mainly discussed the effects of the disaster and ways of mitigating its impact. In the joint press conference after the 2005 summit meeting, however, both Aziz and Blair did not forget to ritualistically reiterate their resolve to fight the menace of terrorism together.
To be more specific, the UK-Pakistan strategic partnership is focussed entirely on terrorism. UK has a serious cause for concern because the empirical evidence flowing in from individual case studies and investigations done by British and other European intelligence agencies have shown that the young participants apprehended in terrorist activities in Britain and other parts of the world were primarily recruited from South Asian Muslim communities (mostly of Pakistani origin) in Britain.
The pre-9/11 terror networks had, in fact, facilitated the movement of a small number of young Muslims from UK to Afghanistan. They underwent training there and participated in the Afghan jihad. After the Soviet pull out, these elements were seen to be leaguing up with Taliban and Al Qaeda and contributing to their strategy of a global Jihad. Although the opportunity to take combat trainings in Afghanistan was lost after the fall of Taliban in 2001-2002, the Islamic extremists from Europe were quite visible in different conflict zones around the world. These radical elements had no respect for national boundaries and human values.
The July 7 suicide bombings have shown that the home-grown extremists in UK would not even spare their home country and strike there as well. More interestingly, the post-7/7 investigations and the reported Heathrow plot also revealed that Pakistan might be serving as a node for at least ideological training of these elements through jihadi organizations in Pakistan. Another cause for concern is that the Jihadi terrorist organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), though already proscribed in Pakistan and UK, do not appear to have been totally neutralised in both the countries.
Stricter surveillance at British and Pakistani airports have already been in place in order to monitor suspected terrorist activities, but given the volume of air traffic between the two countries and the close relationship between the one million strong Pakistani community in UK and its country of origin, it is indeed a formidable task for the concerned authorities to keep a constant vigil on the transit of the extremists between these two countries and isolate them effectively.
On the other hand, even after one year of joint investigations, stricter surveillance and joint anti-terrorist operations, the British and Pakistani authorities have not been able to reduce the threat from terrorists for UK. The magnitude of the threat took the UK security system by surprise in the wake of the reported plot to attack the Heathrow airport in August 2006, which unsettled the whole global air traffic system for quite some days.
Radicalisation of younger generation of Muslims in the name of religion, and their participation in terrorist activities in Britain and elsewhere has remained the most imminent threat facing international community today. If the recent warning of Elizabeth Manningham-Buller, the director of British domestic intelligence agency (MI5) is examined carefully, two important issues come to fore. Firstly, the threat is indeed real and the agencies do not have any immediate solution except close and painstaking observation of terror cells and modules. And secondly, even if it is obligatory on the part of states to cooperate with one another to tackle the menace of terror, in the long run, the onus of defending one's own country against terrorist attacks rests primarily with every individual country. This is true of UK as well. Although the UK has been closely cooperating with other nations- be it at the European or at the international levels-, it is the UK which has to formulate its own counterterrorism policy keeping in view its own security requirements and its own understanding of the radical and restive young Muslim constituency within UK, which is amenable to indoctrination by extremist and terrorist organisations.
The strategic character of this threat became obvious when in November 2006, the British Department for Education and Skills published a guidance paper titled "Promoting Good Campus Relations: Working With Staff and Students to Build Community Cohesion and Tackle Violent Extremism in the Name of Islam". Based upon various instances and observations (some of them are however debatable) on the methods of recruitment by radical Islamist organisations in educational institutes, this document attempts to arrest the trend of further radicalisation. It remains to be seen whether some of the eight recommendations made in the document would be feasible and could be realised in the future. However it is certain that addressing the threat requires whole-hearted participation of the community leadership, lawmakers of Asian origin, media and the British political leadership to devise an antidote to such radicalism.
In an interesting development, a recent study prepared at a think-tank, close to the British Ministry of Defence, has come out with its findings that "indirectly, Pakistan (through the ISI) has been supporting terrorism and extremism, whether in London on 7/7 or in Afghanistan or Iraq". Although the British Ministry of Defence has distanced itself from the study, it was an embarrassment for the Pakistani government. Nonetheless, the study buttressed by field trips done in Pakistan in June this year, reemphasises ISI's all-too-familiar strategy of 'run with the hare and hunt with the hounds'.
In the days ahead, occasional attempts from British and Pakistani governments to put the blame for the radicalisation of a small part of the Muslim community on the other may continue. Hence the bonhomie between the two leaders may seem perfect at present, but the complex terror networks, allegedly nurtured either by the ISI or forces within Pakistan unrelated to the state agencies, would continue to make the 'strategic partnership' more complex and at times even critical, irrespective of change of political leadership in London and Islamabad.
The Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to India signifies an important milestone in bilateral relations. The visit showed that there is a mutual willingness to keep the irritants aside and move forward. Both the powers of Asia have indeed placed greater importance on "stable relations" with each other in the coming days. This was clearly visible in Hu Jintao's "five-point proposals" for developing Sino-Indian relations. The rumours of India-China relations being affected by growing strategic relationship between India and US have been laid to rest for the moment.
Hu Jintao's "Five-point proposals"
President Hu's five points seek to increase political trust, business cooperation, cultural and social exchanges, and multilateral cooperation on the one hand and address the boundary issues on the other. In his interaction with the media, Hu Jintao made it clear that "working together to expand cooperation and create a bright future" was the primary task for both the countries.
Currently, both India and China are conducting a joint feasibility study that is expected to be completed by October 2007. It will lay down the foundation for inter-regional trade. But such initiatives have been undertaken previously between the two countries. In fact, there have been many other issues affecting the pace of bilateral relationship in the past. For example, China's evolving policies towards India in terms of its own domestic priorities, its reactions to Indian aspirations in the subcontinent, and its concerns regarding the role played by other players in the region, i.e., United States, and China's strategic relationship with Pakistan. While relations between India and China have improved in recent years, New Delhi remains concerned about China's longstanding military and economic support to Pakistan.
The Shadow of the Border Issue
The question that strikes one most is to what extent Hu's five point proposals would make a difference to the future course of Sino-Indian relations? If one perceives this visit by the Chinese president as an important landmark in Sino-Indian relations, then it is useful to review the bilateral interactions particularly in terms of the impact they have on the long-running boundary dispute between the two countries. Putting it in another way, one can counter-argue that unresolved territorial disputes tend to inhibit full normalisation of bilateral relations. While both the countries agree to a "package settlement format through negotiation" to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, progress remains slow on the specifics of the boundary issues even after eight rounds of talks.
In fact, just before Hu Jintao's tour, the remark by the Chinese ambassador to India asserting Beijing's claims to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh had sent shockwaves among majority of Indian strategic experts and policy advisors. This clearly highlighted the intractable nature of the border disputes and made it clear that the final resolution of the issue required not only courageous political decisions at the highest level in both the countries but also political skills to sell such a resolution to their respective domestic constituencies.
If Hu's observation, during the course of this visit, that "we hope to turn China-India boundary into a bond of good neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation", be any indicator, the two countries are hoping to benefit from the favourable political ambience created by growing bilateral trade and commerce. By arguing that trade liberalisation would take Sino-Indian ties to new levels, the Chinese president underscored the need for a free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries. He also highlighted the need to increase border trade for greater economic cooperation.
This line of thinking emphasises the point that there is an willingness on the part of the top leadership in China and India to take the relationship forward at the economic front and create the necessary conditions for a political solution to the boundary problem later.
Emerging Dynamics
Despite the temptation of many analysts in the West to characterise Sino-Indian relationship as one of strategic rivalry, there is a new dynamics that is emerging on the horizon now. For instance, China does not regard India as a rival; India also does not look at China in the old balance-of-power framework.
It is quite significant that in spite of many pitfalls in the bilateral relations (including the boundary issue), both the countries have upgraded their diplomatic relations to the current level of "strategic comprehensive partnership for peace and prosperity". It was also clearly evident in the quick corrective measures taken by the Chinese government officials to play down the remarks of their envoy on Arunachal Pradesh in New Delhi. China recognises India as a rising power and views friendly relationship with India as an imperative for peace and economic development in the region, in line with its philosophy of Zhongguó hépíng juéqi or 'peaceful rise'.
Future Ahead
Many leading experts on Sino-Indian relations argue that the "dominant paradigm in which India-China relations are generally analysed is essentially one of the competitive power politics". However, looking at the emerging world order in terms of the developments especially since 9/11, the war on terror, the North Korean nuclear crisis and Hu Jintao's South Asia tour, Sino-Indian relations will depend heavily on three factors: first, the growth of Chinese and Indian economic and military capabilities; second, the interaction of their interests with those of the United States and Pakistan; third, the perception of both China and India towards each other.
The year 2006 will surely be a landmark year in the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship for many reasons. This year will be remembered as a "China-India Friendship Year". The year also witnessed signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Defence Cooperation, which is certainly a major step in bilateral relations.
The skeptics from both sides have, however, hinted at the limitations of bilateral military ties because the links between the two militaries would remain limited in both scope and depth. Furthermore, there is a view that the India-US nuclear deal, China's continuing defence assistance to Pakistan, and the changing East Asian and South Asian strategic landscapes may retard the pace of their strategic relationship.
However, looking at the developments that have taken place in 2006 and especially after Hu Jintao's trip, one can take a more optimistic view of the future Sino-Indian relations. There is a greater willingness and convergence of interest now than ever before to carry their bilateral relations to new heights.
The recently concluded three-day international seminar on Defence Finance and Economics, organised by the Indian Ministry of Defence (Finance) in New Delhi, covered a wide variety of issues concerning defence finance and economics and reflected on varied perspectives and practices from across the globe. The seminar was of particular importance because of the involvement of policy makers, academics, and other experts from think tanks and the media, in exchanging and discussing their views in the realm of the changing business and spectrum of defence worldwide. The discussion focussed on some pressing issues like defence strategies and economics, optimal resource allocation in defence, myriad dimensions in defence acquisition and offsets, defence research and development, defence manpower issues, audit and accountability in defence expenditure and procurement, and cost efficient logistics management in defence.
Focussing on the importance of economics in defence strategies, experts expressed their views on a range of issues like affordable defence, economics of force designs, trends in global defence industry and military expenditure and some core issues of defence economics. Regarding world military expenditure (US $1,118 billion in 2005, according to SIPRI), experts highlighted the fact that in recent years it has been growing at a faster rate and is approaching peak Cold War levels, motivated by the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the last 10-year period (1996-2005) it has shot up by 34 per cent in real terms. However, while global military expenditure has significantly grown, its distribution has been spatial. Low-income countries spend a higher share of the total on personnel and operating costs, while high-income countries spend on arms procurement and military research and development (R&D). In addition, the world arms industry is growing at a faster pace. The SIPRI top 100 arms-producing companies together accounted for $268 billion worth of armaments sales in 2004, a marked growth of 15 per cent over the previous year. With such growth, there have been structural, technological and compositional changes in the arms production industries.
Optimal allocation in the defence sector, another area of discussion, has always been a major challenge for planners. In the 21st century, the challenge has been accentuated by the cut in the defence budget (except in the case of a few countries) in real terms, the extreme capital- and cost-intensive nature of modern war equipment, and by the concept of RMA and Net Centric Warfare. Against this backdrop, proper budgeting, planning and portfolio analysis in defence has become more relevant. As some cross-country evidence shows, the principle of sound allocation of resources for defence is based on identification and probability of risk factor; concept of force design and its costing including the full life cycle costs, and finally optimising measures. Besides, other efficiency measures like outsourcing, project management, management information, use of civilians in defence departments, management and leadership are in use.
Defence acquisition, according to many experts, is a complex and difficult business and holds critical importance because of vulnerability to fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Best practices around the world show that the modern system of acquisition should be more responsive, efficient and effective, i.e., faster, better and cheaper, while focussing on certain achievable outcomes. The effects of competition, life cycle cost considerations, legislative barriers, contract provisions - all need to be examined to get better value for money. Defence offsets, which is being increasingly used by arms buying countries, has become an instrument to leverage the outflow of foreign currencies to supplier countries. While it has placed added pressure on the supply side to oblige the offset obligations, it has also resulted in increased cost of equipment though with no significant benefits for the purchasing countries. Besides, there are many other weaknesses in implementing and over-sighting the whole procedure, which renders the whole policy of little value. Some experts opined that offsets do not promote countries' long-term military industrial goals and does not stimulate broad-based economic development. Moreover, neither substantial nor sustained job creation occurs and only little technology transfer occurs and whatever technology is transferred is quickly outpaced by continuous technology advances in the main supplying countries. However, the ingredients of a successful offset policy warrant a relatively advanced domestic industry to absorb and capitalise on benefits of offsets and with this clear oversight and audit mechanisms are necessary to systematically monitor progress and continuously revamp weaknesses.
Military defence research and development (R&D) expenditure and its interface with those of the civilian sector is a highly contested issue. Panellists demonstrated through statistics that in recent years greater weight is being assigned to more defence R&D expenditures. Statistics also reveal that in the four-year period 2000-2004 global military expenditure grew by 23 per cent to total $85 billion, representing 10 per cent of the total (civilian and military) R&D expenditure worldwide. Factors that led to increased defence R&D expenditure are: the evolution of the RMA into the concept of Network Centric Warfare; the increased need for exceptionally good intelligence capabilities and new set of weapons suitable for global warfare and urban warfare; and the need for commercialising defence technologies through new and improved versions of equipment. However, there exists a huge gulf in defence R&D expenditures between the US and European countries, which has lately resulted in some controversies over the competitiveness of European defence and commercial technologies and on the impact on the transatlantic relationship.
Regarding military manpower, analysts expressed its importance as a vital input in the overall military production function. In the present strategic military environment, its importance has gone up manifold, requiring a skilled, entrepreneurial force level, finely tailored, more accessible to joint operations and better configured to operate with other agencies and international partners. But at the same time, the cost of maintaining a large conventional force and the technology-driven substitution effect has taken centre stage in the military planning process, resulting in rebalancing between active and reserve forces, military to civilian conversions, unified command, etc.
Another crucial aspect is related to defence logistics, the cost of which is around one-fourth of the total defence budget. While no one discounts the importance of this aspect, however, defence capability and its adaptability to future needs depends much on how efficiently this is managed. An efficient management of logistics, as some international practices show, requires performance-based system, where the suppliers are paid fee-per-usage basis instead of paying individually for 'bundled' support systems. For the cost-efficient management of logistics, best practices in the private sector - centralised management and strategic sourcing - can be applied.
In the session on Audit and Accountability, the issue that came to the fore was obtaining the best value for money, the supreme auditing offices of many countries resorting to different forms of auditing to see the legality of expenditure, compliance to rules and their propriety. More importantly, audit institutions also carry out performance audit, or value-for-money audit, to see the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditures. The suggestions/findings of these auditors form the basis on which the respective defence planners and political executives are made accountable. However international evidence, especially those of GAO (USA), OAG (Canada), or CAG of India, shows that defence auditing is not fully followed by necessary accountability. The common shortcomings identified by all these supreme auditors could be attributed to the lack of professionalism in dealing with various aspects of defence management, leading to cost and time overruns. Besides, evidence also shows that most defence departments are manned by birds of passage, and personnel are neither properly trained nor retained for a minimum required period to see the contracts through. Moreover, the absence of legal, technical and financial experts has led to cost and time overruns. Participants voiced the need for greater dialogue among auditors, defence managers, defence personnel and executives.
In the light of above discussions, the international seminar holds special importance for India given that since the beginning of economics reforms in the early nineties, the urgency of fiscal management and better utilisation of budget was strongly felt across the spectrum of economic and non-economic activities. The staggering increase in the Indian defence expenditure (Rs. 89,000 Crore or 2.52 per cent of GDPMP in 2006-07) necessitates the need to ponder over affordability, sustainability and its impact on overall fiscal management and economic development, while not compromising the security apparatus of the country, which has been aggravated by new concerns over asymmetric and non-conventional warfare. Defence has long been left out of rigorous economic analysis because of the 'holy cow' approach as well as due to notions like strategic concerns, absolute state power, etc. These notions have led the country to mess up defence resources. Be it cost-ineffective Qualitative Requirements (QRs), or obtaining greater output/capability, economic aspects have long been sidelined. The seminar itself was a welcome step in the much-neglected field of defence finance and economics in India. The rich knowledge generated during the course of the seminar, if applied by the Ministry of Defence and other stakeholders, could better India's planning, execution and management of defence.
Despite the categorical denial by the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson about a report published by a British newspaper in January 2006, that Islamabad was engaged in talks with China to purchase eight nuclear reactors worth US $7 billion, the Chinese media later disclosed Beijing's plan of signing an agreement to supply six reactors. Speculation in this regard has gained currency now that the two countries are to enter into a nuclear deal during the ongoing visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Pakistan. Pakistan's foreign ministry spokesperson said ambiguously that a "new accord" is not on the cards. The official statement from Pakistan does not however clarify on how close the two sides have come on what they have been negotiating for the last couple of years, including the supply of reactors for Chasma and Karachi.
Beijing tirelessly mentions that its nuclear co-operation with Pakistan is purely for the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy. Yet, any news of China supplying Pakistan with anything in addition to the support given in the past raises international alarm. In fact, nuclear and missile collaboration between the two countries has led to perilous proliferation consequences. Disclosures about the clandestine links between Pakistan and the nuclear programmes of Libya, North Korea and Iran adequately substantiate this point.
Still, the nuclear component always remains high on the agenda of the 'all weather' friendship between China and Pakistan. The dynamics of nuclear cooperation between the two countries involve a number of issues, mainly, securing the non-proliferation regime, Pakistan's dependence on outside support for working on the fuel cycle, and the proliferation vulnerabilities in Pakistan.
The international non-proliferation regime has been facing unprecedented challenges. The most difficult of these involves striking a balance between the promotion of safe nuclear commerce and efforts to control the transfer of nuclear technology (of dual utility - both civilian and military). The stupendous task ahead is how to plug the loopholes in international export control arrangements that otherwise allow State actors to circumvent the obligations prescribed under any regime composed of rules, norms, principles and procedures.
The extant nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, along with the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) regime, has been damaged severely by the indulgence of its member states in clandestine nuclear transfers, while maintaining the façade of working within these frameworks. The disclosures on the Pakistan-based A.Q. Khan network dealt a severe blow to the entire edifice of the NPT. The immediate question raised internationally was who helped Pakistan with critical technologies, and China's role stands out in this regard.
Glossing over what A.Q. Khan confessed to in January 2004 about being instrumental in clandestinely transferring nuclear technology to different parts of the world, China signed in May that year an agreement with Pakistan for the second Chasma Nuclear Power Plant (Chasnupp-II) project worth $600 million. It was a timely Chinese move to stand by its strategic ally at a time when Pakistan's nuclear programme came under enormous suspicion and international scrutiny.
The first 300-megawatt plant (Chasnupp-I) agreement was signed between Pakistan and China in 1991. It faced several technical difficulties before its final inauguration on March 29, 2001, including a fire in the plant, mainly due to problems in handling the imported inputs. It will remain a mystery as to why China cancelled a similar deal with Iran, though some say it was because of US pressure. China, however, went ahead and assisted Pakistan in setting up Chasnupp-I.
Apart from providing Pakistan with sufficient technological and equipment support for setting up the nuclear reactor and reprocessing facilities, China also has helped Pakistan in overcoming certain difficulties in its enrichment programme. Though Pakistan does have a uranium hexafluoride plant in Dera Gazi Khan, which was bought from a German firm, CES Kalthog, on a turnkey basis, the feed material for it in the form of uranium hexafluoride was also reportedly given by China in the initial stages. Pakistan is thus not self-reliant in the nuclear cycle and will continue to depend on China for crucial needs in technology-related matters.
The complex technical parameters of scientific advancements connected to the building of reactors shows how China took a bold step in committing to nuclear co-operation with Pakistan even at the stage when Beijing itself was in the process of perfecting the technology. In fact, Chasnupp-I is a copy of the Qinshan-I reactor in Zhejiang province, and the latter itself faced many technical snags before it finally started operating in April 1994.
It is indeed noteworthy that just before China became a member of the NPT in March 1992 it signed a contract with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) on December 31, 1991 to export the reactor for Chasnupp I. Similarly, it signed the Chasnupp II deal on May 4, 2004, only three weeks before formally joining the NSG on May 28, 2004. According to media reports, other major components of the Chasnupp-II would be manufactured, with Chinese assistance, in Pakistan itself.
Even though China has joined the NSG, one cannot be sure whether the extent of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear sector will be the same as before. But it is quite realistic to assume that, in the foreseeable future, Beijing's aid will remain critical to Pakistan for running its projects, especially those built with Chinese help.
Ironically, China has for long followed a proliferation embedded foreign policy approach to score strategic gains. The perilous consequences of such a policy for international non-proliferation efforts is becoming apparent now. China's role in nurturing the nuclear ambitions of Pakistan and North Korea is now being widely debated. And efforts are on to unearth the true extent of help that was in turn extended by these countries to the Iranian nuclear and missile programmes. It has not only been reported that North Korean and Chinese technicians travelled together to Iran to work on the latter's ballistic missile development programme, but that there have also been secret visits of engineers and scientists from Pakistan and Iran to North Korea.
Zia-ul-Haq had stated in 1986 that " it is our right to obtain technology" and, "when we acquire this technology the Islamic world will posses it with us". But the recent revelations project a larger network of proliferation even beyond the Islamic world, namely North Korea. Today, Pakistan is the hub of international proliferation links.
The international community is struggling to unravel how Libya acquired a Chinese nuclear weapon design and to what extent nuclear related transfers from Pakistan has benefited North Korea. In addition, though it is not yet confirmed from where North Korea obtained the weapon design, the fear is that Iran could soon follow Pyongyang into the nuclear weapons club. The gravest perceived danger is nuclear technology and material falling into the hands of terrorist groups.
Without structuring effective international mechanisms to rectify the lapses as reported in Pakistan, the expansion of nuclear infrastructure in that country would remain open to potential proliferation vulnerabilities. Yet, its foreign minister, Khursheed Kasuri, says that Pakistan is preparing to 'establish nuclear parks in the country'. One hopes that China would exercise restraint even as it helps Pakistan in the nuclear field.
Efforts by the Government of India on the one hand and by non-governmental organizations on the other to bring the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) to the negotiating table have not progressed very far. The rebel group continues its subversive agenda, targeting security forces personnel, bombing crowded market places, oil and gas pipelines and various state establishments and installations.
In one of the latest incidents of violence in Assam, at least 15 people were killed and close to 50 others were wounded on November 5, 2006 in two separate incidents of bomb blasts at the crowded Fancy Bazaar and Noonmati area of Guwahati city. Though there is no evidence yet to establish that the ULFA was involved in the twin blasts, however, going by its past track record, the needle of suspicion points towards it. There is wide speculation that some 'jihadi' groups might have extended support to the ULFA in carrying out the attacks.
It may not be out of context to note that since this incident the ULFA has intensified its subversive agenda. Between November 6 and 16, 2006, at least seven persons including two ULFA militants, two soldiers and three civilians were killed. At the same time there have been at least seven incidents of bomb explosions targeting mainly oil and gas pipelines that run through the eastern oil producing districts of Dibrugarh and Tinsukia. Incidents of bomb explosions in the State have been increasing in the past few years. There were just about 76 blasts in 2004, as against 121 in 2005 and as many as 100 blasts this year as of November 17.
Assam Police sources have claimed that the ULFA has switched over from "difficult and risky" military combat to the more damaging but easy-to-execute jihadi-type operations in urban areas. This change of strategy has been mainly due to stepped up counter-insurgency operations coupled with the ULFA's diminishing cadre strength. These sources have also stated that the outfit gave a crash course to new recruits in handling explosives at its transit bases in the jungles of adjoining Arunachal Pradesh, Garo Hills of Meghalaya and the border areas of Bhutan. In the words of one Assam police official, "planting explosives and lobbing grenades in public places, preferably under cover of darkness, constitute the new modus operandi of ULFA operations."
Pursuant to the Government of India's policy of engaging with any group that abjures the path of violence and seeks resolution of grievances within the framework of the Indian Constitution, several militant groups have come forward for talks. Presently, at least three militant groups in Assam - Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) - have entered into a ceasefire/suspension of operations agreements with the Union Government. When the ULFA-backed People's Consultative Group (PCG) was constituted in September 2005, there were high hopes among Assamese that the much-cherished peace may finally return to Assam. Unfortunately, the peace initiative to facilitate direct talks between the ULFA and the Union Government has remained a non-starter. The Union Government suspended army operations against the ULFA on August 13, 2006, but called it off just over a month later on September 24 following the ULFA's continued violations of the truce. The final provocation came when ULFA killed a tea estate manager, Harendranath Das, at Digboi town in Tinsukia District on September 23. A day earlier, a policeman was shot dead at Than Gaon village in Dibrugarh District.
ULFA has indeed used the brief ceasefire period to regroup itself rather than prepare for a dialogue with the government. Consequently, intelligence agencies have warned security forces of a series of possible attacks by the ULFA on oil installations, rail tracks and various government-owned institutions. Moreover, there are alarming reports of ULFA trying to re-establish its camps and hideouts in Bhutan, though Bhutanese authorities have denied outright such claims.
Meanwhile, the ULFA described the recent November 14 meeting of the People's Consultative Group (PCG) members, Indira Goswami and Rebati phu*kan, with National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan as a "fraudulent endeavour" aimed at ensuring that the forthcoming Republic Day passed off without any violent incident. The outfit stated in its publication Freedom that "Sovereignty is the only way for restoration of peace in Asom. To bring the negotiation process back on track the Government of India must send a formal proposal through the PCG, and the core issue of the talks should be restoration of sovereignty in Asom." Moreover, on November 18, the rebel group issued an "appeal" to sportspersons to stay away from the forthcoming National Games scheduled to be held in Guwahati in February 2007, saying that it was being organised by "occupational forces" that are not serious about the resolution of the "Indo-Asom conflict".
In the aftermath of the recent bomb blasts, the security forces have stepped up counter-insurgency operations against the ULFA though with a modified strategy. The effectiveness of such counter-insurgency operation, however, remains doubtful in view of the ULFA'S easy access to neighbouring countries, principally Bangladesh and Myanmar. Top ULFA leaders, including Paresh Barua and Arabinda Rajkhowa, who are widely believed to be operating out of Bangladesh, are in the grip of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh's Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). These agencies would not easily let the ULFA escape their control and talk peace with New Delhi.
Vietnam was inducted into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on November 8, 2006. This was approved by the General Council, the WTO's major decision-making unit, after due deliberations on October 26. One hindrance in the realisation of Vietnam's WTO membership plans has been the passing of the "Permanent Normal Trade Relation" (PNTR) bill in the US Congress. Earlier the United States Finance Committee had passed the bill on August 1, 2006 by 20 to 18 votes in favour. In fact, the US was planning to grant PNTR status to Vietnam prior to the APEC summit on November 18-19 in Hanoi, but this did not happen due to legislative wrangles. Granting PNTR status would safeguard US interests in the region by engaging an erstwhile adversary, which is also one of the most populous nations in Southeast Asia. It is expected that the PNTR status bill might face resistance in the US Congress because of some legislators harping on the issue of Vietnam's stance on religious freedom and human rights. On the other hand, the US is compelled to get the bill passed because otherwise it would be violating WTO modalities for equal trade and non-discrimination rules.
Accession to WTO means that Vietnam has to continue talks with its current members to ensure that its trade policies are in consonance with WTO rules. It also has to assure present members that it would be in compliance of provisions in the areas of tariffs, import quotas, farm subsidies and liberalisation in the services market. WTO membership is crucial for Vietnam in terms of aligning itself with the world economic community. It would propel its economic growth and prosperity. Hanoi has been treading cautiously on this matter, though it has shown promise by contributing to the liberalised trade regime through its bilateral accord with the United States in May 2006. As part of the trade negotiations, future members have to enter bilateral arrangements with other trading nations as well. Having gained approval in the WTO General Council meeting, it would be compulsory for Vietnam to ratify the accession and then wait for a month to be confirmed as a full member.
Vietnam would be the second most populous country after China to accede to WTO in East Asia. It has endorsed 22 out of 28 deals needed to be a member of WTO and has negotiated with its main trading partners like China, Japan and the European Union (EU), while there are still issues to be resolved with United States, New Zealand and Australia. The US and Vietnam are making headway on the issue of market access for US business, agricultural and industrial subsidies as well as financial services. Though there are contentious issues between the US and Vietnam, the former has endorsed Hanoi's full membership of the WTO because of several reasons.
Firstly, Vietnam's economic growth is quite robust at about 8.4 per cent in 2005. It exported $6.5 billion worth of goods last year to the United States. Secondly, its relatively young population (about 80 per cent of its population is below the age of 30) means that it could be a very good manufacturing centre for US business entrepreneurs who are at a disadvantage because of low labour costs in China and India. Thirdly, from the strategic point of view, it would hurt China in a way because as of now Vietnam acts as a raw material provider to China and if industrial structures are established then Vietnam would do more second stage manufacturing thus eating into China's share of the market. Finally, in order to curb Chinese economic hegemony in the East Asian region, Vietnam is likely to attract financial support and investments from Japan and Taiwan.
But there is also an apprehension that Vietnam might go the Mexico way. Mexico has a big trading partner in the form of the US in its neighbourhood because of which it has been unable to add value to products made domestically. This has meant that it has remained an assembly zone and supplier of raw materials, thus missing out on a huge growth potential. However, such a scenario is not inevitable with respect to Vietnam given the interest of regional economic powers and the strategy of the EU and the US to checkmate China in the world market. In fact, one of the strategic purposes of the US is to streamline its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is now principally directed towards China, and divert it to Vietnam so that its short-term economic interests are not hampered. This logic is augmented by the fact that the US is willing to help Vietnam financially in setting up basic economic infrastructure to enable compliance with WTO regulations.
In this milieu, it has been seen that owing to the sanctions on Chinese textiles India's textiles export to the European market had increased in early 2006. But with the induction of Vietnam, there would be another viable competitor for the same range of products. Vietnam might also emerge as a shadow-manufacturing base for Chinese products and so the rules of origin have to be imposed meticulously. While on the one hand India has to face major competition from China, on the other hand Vietnam's emergence in the coming years would make it imperative that India invests in that country so as to reap the benefits of economies of scale as well as low labour costs, thus emerging as a trusted economic partner of Vietnam in the process. It would be unjust to say that everything would be just fine with Vietnam's economic development and accession to WTO, though India can act as a human resource developer given its expertise and skilled workforce in English, which Vietnam lacks.
India would face stiff competition with the emergence of Vietnam especially given that the US would be willing to locate its manufacturing facilities as well as invest in that country. In order to reap the benefits of trade liberalisation, Vietnam has to transform its centrally planned economy into a market oriented economy as well as its economic superstructure from an agriculture based economy to a more industrialised one. It has to have more effective fiscal expenditure, an upgraded banking system, real estate market reforms and a more robust capital market along with labour reforms to meet WTO requirements. In case Vietnam obtains huge foreign investments and industrial know-how, it might even surpass Chinese productivity on a smaller scale and cater to the long-term strategic calculations of the western world. Such expectations could well become a reality in the future. Vietnam's accession to WTO would not only create more competition in the world markets but also define new economic calculations in Asia.
Refuting China's claim over Arunachal Pradesh, India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee firmly reiterated that "The whole of Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India." Coming as it did days before the Chinese President's four-day visit to India from November 20, 2006, the statement made by China's Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, that "In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that. That is our position," is unfortunate. Though the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, has downplayed the envoy's remarks, there is need to ponder over such statements. In fact, such statements from a high level government official raises the question as to why China chose to make such statements when President Hu Jintao is slated to visit India? Does it reflect hidden complexities in the Sino-Indian border negotiations? Does it reflect China's diplomatic tactics? What does it say about China's larger foreign policy goals? While India should firmly refute such statements and adopt a pragmatic and resolute stand on the border dispute, it should also hone up its negotiating skills to confront a rising China.
The statement reflects larger calculations in the Chinese game plan on border negotiations. It is well known that the border talks have gone on for a long time without any solution in sight. The Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings on the border resolution have been a failure. The border talks were thereafter raised to the high level Special Representative Group (SRG) meetings. So far, seven rounds of SRG meetings have taken place. However, no reports on the nature of progress made on the border talks have come out from either side. What can however be deduced from the SRG meetings is that the border negotiations have entered a crucial stage. This much was indicated by National Security Advisor, M. K. Narayanan, the Special Representative from the Indian side. The statement from the Chinese ambassador should be seen in this context. First, it reflects a hardening of China's stand on the border issue. Second, it could also mean that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is playing a role in influencing Chinese negotiations on the border talks. Third, it indicates a Chinese strategy to understand Indian minds on the vexed border issue as well as to gauge India's diplomatic preparedness. Such a statement prior to Hu's visit, thus, indicates China's larger foreign policy strategy and negotiating skills in dealing with contentious foreign policy issues.
A crucial component of China's foreign policy is border diplomacy. China calls this a "greater periphery strategy". It identifies the greater periphery as comprising Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. According to one Chinese scholar, China regards the greater periphery as the main battlefield for safeguarding its national security and upholding its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The greater periphery is also the zone that supports China's sustainable development and serves as a principal source of its energy resources. Finally, this four-region zone is crucially linked to China's ultimate growth as a major power. However, China views the role of the US with its alliance systems in Asia as a challenge to its greater periphery strategy. The other challenge is its existing territorial and maritime disputes with ASEAN, India and Japan. China's border dispute with India should be placed in this wider foreign policy of greater periphery strategy where the underlying aim is to acquire great power status through sustained economic growth and peaceful diplomacy. In this context, China aims at greater engagement with India under the co-operative security framework.
While India should extend the scope of engagement with China and explore new areas of co-operation, it should also firm up its own foreign policy strategy. One way to assert our own foreign policy positions would be by issuing position papers or White Papers on contentious issues. Generally, White Papers help to define foreign policy interests and goals as well as defend and uphold the nation's sovereign rights on issues of a controversial nature. So far India has no such White Paper on any of the contentious issues. It should come out with White Papers on Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh, indicating its position on the contentious border issue. China claims around 36,000 square miles of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh, while it has occupied some 15,200 square miles in Kashmir.
Another significant way to firm up our foreign policy means would be by adopting aggressive economic diplomacy on the border that would boost our periphery strategy. The border economic diplomacy would include the creation of intensive infrastructural links and establishment of trans-border sub-regional mechanisms. India has lately woken up to China's aggressive road building along the Sino-Indian border. It finalised some 27 projects for construction of new roads along this border under the initiative of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in May 2006. Though India is a latecomer in infrastructural development, it has to regularly monitor and hasten infrastructural development. Among the sub-regional integration efforts, while China's Mekong Basin Project efforts have gone apace, India's Mekong-Ganga Co-operation has stalled. New Delhi should, therefore, take serious steps to augment its regional integration projects as they are not only important means to build strong economic linkages but also contribute to the country's power projection.
Besides strengthening our own foreign policy strategy, India needs to understand the Chinese mind-set. This would enable us to sharpen our negotiating skills. An important means to understand the Chinese mind is through the creation of greater channels of interaction between the two countries. The Meeting of the China-India Eminent Persons' Group that was first initiated in 2001 serves as an important advisory agency for the two governments and help in boosting mutual trust between them. Such meetings should be held regularly to hasten the process of bilateral understanding. Regular exchanges between the think tanks of the two countries would also help to firm up foreign policy directions. It may be noted that before every high level visit from China, there is a flurry of activity among Chinese research think tanks, either visiting India or organising meetings with their Indian counterparts in China. Unlike in India, in China most think tanks are either directly under a ministry or the State Council and play an important role in providing policy inputs to the government.
While these are a few steps to strengthen Indian diplomacy and negotiating strategy, at a more specific level like border negotiations, India should avoid making any unilateral concessions to China. It may be recalled that the Indian Prime Minister's 2003 visit to China resulted in India's explicit recognition of Tibet as a part of Chinese territory without any reciprocal commitment from the Chinese side on Sikkim. This showed India in a poor diplomatic light and exposed its weak negotiating skills. India should, therefore, develop its negotiating skills so as not to get caught unawares while dealing with China.
In the context of Hu Jintao's visit, India needs to be clear about its own foreign policy gaols as well as understand China's foreign policy strategy. This would help India to avoid ad-hocism in policymaking and enable the formulation of a long-term China policy. While reminding China that Yuxi's statement is detrimental to long-term Sino-Indian relations, India should resolutely point out that peaceful relations between them is imperative for their goals of emerging as major powers.
As the India-China relationship continues to grow in the new Asian dynamics, Mr. Hu Jintao's maiden visit will indeed help to keep the momentum of improving ties going. The main thrust of both governments will be to establish greater political trust for future co-operation. Two-way trade between India and China is likely to touch US $24 billion this year. There are high expectations on both sides. Manmohan Singh and Hu know each other well. They have met and held talks five times during the last two years. Both have repeatedly affirmed their belief and commitment in charting out a mutually beneficial agenda for the expansion of India-China relations. Yet, the UPA government seems to be entirely unaware of the historic moves that Hu is about to make in Islamabad. India's laxity towards the unfolding Chinese strategy in Kashmir is clear. New Delhi has gone to sleep while China unveils a strategy to extend its economic and political influence across the Himalayas into the subcontinent.
China's close ties with Pakistan have been very important to Beijing and Islamabad has played a major role in China's long-term strategy. Moving ahead on the path of "time tested friendship," China and Pakistan are set to firm up a new generation of co-operative agreements encompassing multi-billion dollar investment deals in nuclear energy, oil refinery, coal, copper and gold extraction, trade, industry, railway, and expansion of the Karakoram Highway during Hu Jintao's upcoming visit.
Most importantly, during Hu's visit to Pakistan, a major agreement that is likely to be signed would be one dealing with the widening of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) from the current 10 metres to 30 metres. Once completed, this project would give a major boost to the overall quantum of economic co-operation between the two countries, including in areas such as industrial infrastructure and nuclear energy. Notably, a memorandum of understanding for expansion of the highway was signed in June 2006. The two countries will now formalise a contract leading to the actual ground breaking of the US$ 794 million project. The Chinese Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) has completed the feasibility study, and the China Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (CASAC) has already made appropriate financial allocation to kick-start the construction.
Meanwhile, Islamabad has decided to upgrade the KKH for improving road connectivity throughout the year. According to Pakistani media reports, the National Highway Authority of Pakistan will construct the 97-kilometre Hasanbadal-Mansehra section and the 254-kilometer Railkoat-Khunjerab section of the KKH. The Pakistan government has also decided to construct four additional bridges on the Indus for east-west connectivity between the Indus Highway and the north-south link.
Apart from expanding the capacity of the KKH, China has also agreed to lay a fibre optic line and to consider building a rail link from Havelian to the China border along this strategic highway. The agreement to lay down a rail link is also expected to be signed during Hu's visit. Rail lines have always been about integrating markets and projecting political and military power. Chinese strategy to improve connectivity in such a difficult terrain will rapidly integrate Pakistan occupied areas of Kashmir into the Chinese economy. Earlier this year, China opened a dry port at Sust on the Khunjerab pass near its border with Pakistan to promote trade between Xinjiang and Kashmir and launched a new bus service between Kashgar and Gilgit.
While inaugurating the Sust dry port, President General Pervez Musharraf underlined Pakistan's central geo-strategic location at the heart of the region, which included the western parts of China, Central Asian states, Afghanistan, Iran, India, and the oil-rich Gulf countries. Dwelling on the importance of the port, Musharraf said an elaborate network of infrastructure being put in place across Pakistan and improvement in the Karakoram Highway would provide China the shortest access to the Middle East and other world markets through Pakistani deep-sea ports including Gwadar. He said, "We are talking of Pakistan-China inter-connectivity in terms of energy and trade, improvement in the KKH, development of railway link and gas and oil pipeline linkages and even fibre optics connectivity along the KKH under one project simultaneously will open up immense prospects of trade and economic growth." He also added "We are capable of creating 9th and 10th wonders of the world in the form of railway and pipeline linkage between Pakistan and China." Despite the fact that the trans-Karakoram transport and energy corridor is a distant reality, it is likely to alter the geopolitics of Jammu and Kashmir. Importantly, it will bolster the role of the Northern Areas as a bridge between China and Pakistan.
There is no doubt that China has a clear and consistent strategy behind the rapid development of infrastructure in Western China. In fact, we are witnessing a quantum leap in China's western oriented transportation infrastructure. China is systematically applying modern transport technology to penetrate the high Himalayas. Apart from altering the relationship between human activity and geographic space, these technologies have also enabled China to substantially increase its capabilities.
Instead of ignoring and or protesting against these developments, India must learn lessons from China. The question we first have to answer is: what to do to safeguard our interest? The strategic consequences of connectivity across the high Himalayas must be taken into account. While the Chinese military threat has waned and instead economic challenges loom large, India needs a smart strategy to meet it. This must include modern transport corridors along and across its border. Making the borders irrelevant is a good strategy. Borders should become meeting points of ideas, people and goods, rather than dividing lines. For this, India needs to rejuvenate its traditional transport linkages with neighbouring countries effectively. This requires changing the mindset, courage and political will.
The two hill districts of Assam, North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong, are fascinating because these territories together are a microcosm of the larger ethnic profile of Northeast India. The indigenous peoples inhabiting this small area have tribal affiliations with far-flung groups in the surrounding hill states. They are Karbi (most dominant numerically), Dimasa, Jeme Naga, Kuki, Hmar, Lushai, Rangkhol, Khasi, Jaintia, Bodo and Tiwa. It is no wonder that the effects of the multiple insurgencies going on in the vicinity - Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and plains of Assam - have gradually but inevitably spilled over into the two hill districts. This has become more likely given the rise of better communications in recent years. These so called "autonomous" hill districts of Assam are the least developed, kind of a forgotten backyard for the dominant Assamese who are not native to this area, being plainspeople of the Brahmaputra and Barak valleys. The latter is, however, dominated by ethnic Bengalis of East Pakistan origins.
The Dimasas are an indigenous people of Assam and due to the tribulations of history have their present day home in the North Cachar Hills District. There are also a few Dimasa villages in Karbi Anglong and Cachar Districts. Dimasa organized militancy started with the Dimasa National Security Force, but lacking fizzle, its members surrendered en masse to the government. Subsequently, the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) was formed in 1995, which is still a force to be reckoned with today. The DHD is premised on the ideology of carving out a separate Dimasa homeland "Dimaraji Kingdom" comprising the Dimasa inhabited areas of North Cachar Hills, Karbi Anglong, parts of Nowgaon district, and parts of Dimapur district of Nagaland. However, internal dissensions have led to the DHD's split into two outfits, one led by 'commander' Dilip Nunisa and the other by 'former commander' Jewel Gorlosa. The latter group has an alias, 'The Black Widow'.
The other most dominant militant group is the United Peoples Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) of Karbi Anglong. Formed in 1999, the UPDS is a rebel group fighting for a separate Karbi homeland outside of Assam. The two insurgent groups have been engaged in a bitter turf battle for years, with violent clashes killing hundreds and rendering many more homeless in the villages dotting the hilly terrain of the two districts. According to a report by the Asian Centre for Human Rights, as a result of the ongoing conflict, nearly 44,016 ethnic Karbis and Dimasas have been displaced till October 2005 in Karbi Anglong, North Cachar Hills and Hojai sub-division of Nowgaon district. What makes matters worse is that these two groups lay claim to the same piece of land, especially in the Karbi Anglong district, which is largely dominated by the Karbi tribe.
The Government of India had entered into a cease-fire with the UPDS effective from August 1, 2002, extended periodically till July 31, 2007, and with the DHD since January 1, 2003, extended periodically till December 31, 2006. However, violence broke out on September 26, 2005 when three Dimasa autorickshaw drivers were murdered at Tissom village near Diphu, the district headquarters of Karbi Anglong. In retaliation, five members of a Karbi family were killed at Hemari Terang village on October 2, 2005. Such retaliatory attacks continued throughout the later part of 2005. Most gruesome was the killing of 34 Karbi villagers on October 17, 2005 in Doyangmukh village of Karbi Anglong district. The DHD and UPDS rebels also set fire to 50 houses in the village. In this context, the villagers expressed anguish that they are increasingly becoming victims of armed clashes between the two rebel groups to neither of which they extend support nor have ethnic affinity.
More recently, the anti-talk faction of the DHD, the Gorlosa faction, carried out an ambush in the North Cachar Hills on a railway team in October 2006, killing 11 persons, including seven Railway Protection Special Force (RPSF) personnel. Earlier in February 2006, 30 cadres of the Hmar People's Convention (Democratic) entered the North Cachar Hills from Manipur and set up camp in Jinam Valley, 80 km southeast of Haflong, the district headquarters. In connivance with the Hmar People's Convention, the Gorlosa faction made an attempt on the life of Dilip Nunisa, leader of the pro-talk DHD.
The repeated killings of members of so-called rival ethnic groups are gradually vitiating the cordial atmosphere of concord that had existed between the two communities in the not too distant past. As usual, the state authorities are being taken unawares by the spate of violence and appear to be lacking the logistical requisites to launch a rescue and relief operation. The inaccessible nature of the terrain, crisscrossed by hills and rivers and dense forest, demands a counter-force equipped with sophisticated skills of mountain warfare in countering such hill-based ethnic insurgencies. Moreover, besides being a law and order problem, the conflict is between two ethnic rebel groups inhabiting a contiguous landscape. This requires a more sensitive approach rather than purely "hard core" policing measures.
The government could tap into well-established bodies like the organisations for Dimasa and Karbi women. In tribal societies, women have a major role to play in the overall decision making of the village. (Manipur and Nagaland are good examples of women's role in conflict resolution and management). The State as well as district administration could hold meetings with other active civil society groups in these areas to find realistic ways of dealing with the growing crisis. Basic facilities like roadways, hospitals, schools and water supply could be improved to bring about a steep drop in people's hardships and ease up a hard hill life. It is not true to say that resources at the districts' disposal for development activities are meagre. A cursory glance at funds earmarked for these two hill districts in the Assam State treasury would reveal that they are more than sufficient to establish a "good enough" base for developmental purposes. For instance, under the Hill Areas Development Programme (HADP) of the Planning Commission, Assam was allocated Rs. 51.11 crores in 2003-04 and 2004-05 for the development of its two hill districts. Political parties do not help matters much either, with the Congress, the Asom Gana Parishad, and the Bharatiya Janata Party blaming each other for the volatile situation. These parties are clueless in finding a solution to the problem.
The primary fear expressed in policy and security circles is the growing prowess of the DHD (Gorlosa faction) and the rapid spread of its activities across the landscape of North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong. Given the fact that the cadres are mostly young men from the area, their understanding of the local terrain is intrinsic and therefore crucial in carrying out sudden surprise strikes. Perhaps, this local intelligence skill is equipping the DHD faction with the ability to outmanoeuvre the security forces. Growing nexus with larger insurgent groups like the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (IM) is also providing the DHD, especially the Gorlosa faction, with strategic and tactical guidelines, weapons and finance from across the border. New Delhi's lacklustre approach in rising up to the challenge of small insurgent groups is also becoming an obstacle in applying time-tested solutions to such crises. The pro-talk DHD faction chief, Dilip Nunisa, is threatening to pick up the gun again as his security related proposals to the Home Ministry are yet to invoke any meaningful response. The group's deputy commander-in-chief, Nairing Daulagupu, was badly wounded in Haflong by the Gorlosa faction in April 2006. The last peace talks with the Nunisa group were held in January 2006 and the group's demand for more security cover has not been met yet.
The dynamics of the situation is a struggle to gain dominance with the objective of establishing a totalitarian, ethnically slanted future political domain in the two hill districts. This has degenerated into a free for all pattern of deadly strikes and retaliation between the two dominant peoples, namely the Karbis and Dimasas, with the other smaller groups also being drawn into the conflict. The other major point of conflict is the bloody feud between the DHD factions. What is also frightening is the discernible NSCN-IM influence on the DHD's ideology of territorial claim in Karbi Anglong. Very much like the NSCN-IM's aspiration for a greater Nagalim, contested narratives of territory and tribal affiliation notwithstanding, the DHD Gorlosa faction is laying claim to typically Karbi dominated areas that have only a sprinkling of Dimasa villages. This is a deadly recipe for greater violence and ethnic discord. As the law and order authority, the government has to contain the situation by clearly mapping the territories/peoples under consideration in any talks with these outfits. Dimasa land has to be clearly demarcated from Karbi land to discourage any extra-territorial claims. Out of area Dimasa villages could be integrated within a "Dimasa Tribal Council" very much on the lines of the indigenous peoples of the Americas, Australia and New Zealand. This arrangement would apply to Dimasas in both Karbi Anglong and Cachar districts. Overlapping/clashing jurisdictions have to be worked out parallel to successful models elsewhere. All claims/counter claims have to be ironed out through talks.
The immediate ground measure would however be a strong military presence to discourage ethnic cleansing. This would also create conditions for enforcement of cease-fire ground rules especially in keeping the cadres of the UPDS and DHD in designated camps as agreed under the cease-fire agreements. It would also be beneficial to the affected communities if the Assam government were to set up an institutional mechanism to monitor the cease-fire on a "round the clock" basis and keep a vigilant count on internally displaced persons. Intelligence gathering by a mountain trained and combat hardened military team is crucial for early warning and assessment of probable strike areas in an otherwise densely forested region. For this to happen in an effective and efficient manner, it is crucial to recruit local youths who inherently possess a deep understanding of the terrain. Also, the government would then have the doubly more important security task of protecting the villages and families from where these youths are recruited into the intelligence team, to avoid possible retaliation by rebel groups.
Though the task appears to be of a tall order, it is not impossible to achieve. There are many unemployed youths, who, if guided and trained well, would be an asset to the Indian military in these 'special' combat operations. Once security is ensured, more substantive measures of economic development and social harmony should be instilled by a well thought out and planned peace process. This must account for the complex ethnic dynamics. A sound rehabilitation package, which not only provides for reconstruction of destroyed houses, compensation for lost properties and food but also securing the affected areas must be set in place. The Indian state must be viewed by the local communities as a "welfare organism" motivated by a democratic ethos rather than one of a military nature, an image omnipresent in these hill areas on account of the frequent highly visible counter-insurgency operations. These remote hill villages must come to look upon the 'idea of India' as one of their own, in which they have high stakes. Time is short. The government needs to act fast, with vision and fortitude and determination. If not, the danger of violent insurgencies spreading its network to even smaller tribes in Assam appears all but inevitable.
